BlockFi, situated in New Jersey, claimed in a court document that it owed money to more than 100,000 creditors. It named FTX, a cryptocurrency exchange that is due $275 million on a loan from earlier this year, as its second-largest creditor.
MARTHA REYES-HULME, HEAD OF RESEARCH, BEQUANT, LONDON, COMMENTS
In the brief history of our business, the bankruptcy of BlockFi is a sad chapter that has made participants more aware of risk management, counterparty risk, and governance. Diversification has traditionally been used by our clients to reduce exchange risk, but lately we've noticed a lot of them pulling back temporarily in favor of better long-term asset protection strategies, particularly in the area of custody. With them, we are collaborating closely. In the end, everyone will benefit more from it. Even in these trying times, there is still interest in joining, which is encouraging, as well as interest from mainstream institutions that came to our conference last week.
Senior Director of Fitch Ratings in London, Monsur Hussain
"BlockFi's Chapter 11 reorganization highlights considerable asset contagion risks related to the crypto industry, as well as perhaps inadequate risk management methods. Restructuring procedures can take a long time; eight years after the operation's failure, Mt. Gox's creditors are still waiting to be compensated.
TORONTO'S MARK CONNORS, 3iQ DIGITAL ASSET MANAGEMENT
"Leveraged tactics are more vulnerable during a moment of unwinding and consolidation, which is where we are right now. I don't think many people were shocked by the BlockFi filing, which is important since we're attempting to sort the wheat from the chaff. BlockFi obtained a $250 million loan from FTX in the second quarter, probably out of self-interest to support the overleveraged Alameda. Therefore, today's behavior was expected.
Institutional investment is currently on hold as a result of this. What failed will be the first thing to be evaluated. We think it's the centralized, unregulated entities. Institutions will therefore reflect and ask themselves, "Did we invest in the wrong people at the VC stage?" That will probably receive a resounding "yes." Does this imply that Ethereum and Bitcoin, the two key protocols that make up roughly 60% of the digital asset market, have flaws? No institutional investor can claim that those protocols fell short or are no longer as promising as they were prior to the FTX debacle. Institutions are still interested, but regulators must outline the rules of the game so that institutions can comply.
There exist logical (crypto) financing models. The decentralized financing models were collateralized properly and are still in place. Certain centralized models didn't. I believe the models who have weak lungs are the ones who fail first. You had better understand very well where the 18% yield that a corporation offers you is coming from.
"FTX US, I believe, is BlockFi's second-largest creditor. But the real question is, was that in FTT tokens or in cash? You would have physical assets or U.S. currency in other bankruptcies. Although we have no idea if they loaned (FTT) to BlockFi, our inquiries are valid.
RESEARCH ANALYST CONOR RYDER, KAIKO, DUBLIN
"The BlockFi filing is the most recent in a series of FTX-related contagion occurrences, and it may also be the ongoing effects of Celsius/Three Arrows Capital last summer. Another instance of poor risk management at a period of rising prices, as the crypto winter came and exposed those who assumed the most counterparty risk.
"From the perspective of the customer, it serves as a further caution to be wary of any cryptocurrency yield products that are being offered, especially those that seem too good to be true. The biggest warning sign right now that a business is taking on more risk with your assets should be that.
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